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ABSTRACT. This article critically analyses European jurisprudence to ascertain the extent to 
which the right to freedom of religion has been interpreted as a right of religion to internal 
autonomy. It asserts that women are being denied an effective right to freedom of religion inso-
far as they are unable to directly influence the content or structure of their religion. It argues 
that to fulfil women’s equal right to freedom of religion, women’s power and position within 
religion must be equivalent to men’s. It therefore asserts that an intrinsic part of States’ obliga-
tion to secure the right to freedom of religion is the facilitation of gender equality within relig-
ion. The article culminates by proposing proportionate and appropriate methods to facilitate 
gender equality within religion. 
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Women, half the human race, have been invisible within 
churches and religions dominated by men. Women’s modes of 
practice and organisation may be, as with other minorities, 





Women are half of the human race and yet the issue of women’s 
equality has yet to be definitively addressed in relation to their right to 
religion and belief. It is ironic that while human rights instruments pro-
claim that everyone is equal, the attainment of this fundamental truth is 
hampered by traditional, and often limited, interpretations of human 
rights. The limitations placed on the attainment of women’s equality, by 
the current judicial and political understanding of the right to freedom 
of religion, is an apt example of this. It is recognised in international and 
________________ 
1 This is an updated version of the article published in the Human Rights Law 
Review: Stuart, 2010. 
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regional fora that ‘women’s rights are often curtailed or violated in the 
name of religion.’2 States are continually reminded of their obligations to 
‘fully protect… women against all violations of their rights based on or 
attributed to religion.’3 While it is true that ‘religion is one of the chief 
perpetrators of women’s subjugation, inequality, lower social status, 
lack of equal treatment and protection, and internalised notions of infe-
riority' (Rao, 1999, p. 118), it should not be forgotten that women also 
have a right to religion and belief. The right to freedom of religion and 
belief is invariably phrased as being in opposition to women’s rights and 
equality; this is however an overly simplistic and counterproductive 
stance. Religious institutions play a vital role in the cultivation and reali-
sation of all rights, not merely religious rights (see Witte & Vyver, 1996, 
p. xxxiv). Being male dominated, religious institutions generally limit 
women’s role within a religion, both in their doctrine and ability to be 
office holders, vis a vis men. This inequality needs to be addressed within 
human rights law and domestic legal systems and politics .If one simply 
sees religion and women’s rights as clashing and mutually exclusive, 
there is a danger that gender equality will not be fully realised and an 
important part of women’s lives left unacknowledged, unprotected and 
unfulfilled. 
Human rights research in the area of gender equality and religion 
has tended to concentrate on the treatment of women in religious States 
or under religious personal laws. Whilst this is of pivotal importance, the 
negative influence that gender discrimination within religion has on gen-
der equality as a whole has not yet been accepted as a worldwide phe-
nomenon, present in every country. A woman’s equal right to her spiritual 
and religious beliefs, and her role within her religion, has yet to be ad-
dressed. Gender discrimination is prevalent in the vast majority of institu-
tionalised religions, where it is left undisturbed or tackled by States  
regardless of their stated commitment to gender equality within their 
society and the world at large. It is important to reiterate the legal obli-
gation under international and regional human rights law that every 
State has to facilitate gender equality within their jurisdiction, regard-
less of where this discrimination is occurring. To ensure that ‘western’ 
________________ 
2 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1464, Women and Re-
ligion in Europe 4 October 2005 at para. 2. 
3 Ibid. at para. 7.1; see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28 
on Equality of rights between men and women (Article 3), 29 March 2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 at para. 5. 
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States recognise the necessity and the legal obligation incumbent on 
them to deal with such gender discrimination, this article concentrates 
on the legal gender equality obligations, created by the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Convention), on Council of Europe member States. The same arguments 
could, however, be made in relation to all States with respect to their 
fundamental legal obligations to ensure gender equality, as outlined in 
the human rights Conventions they have ratified and international, re-
gional and domestic jurisprudence.4 Whereas the struggle for gender 
equality within religion may be harder to pursue in some States, the le-
gal obligation to ‘promote’ such gender equality is still binding on each 
State, as demonstrated later in this article. 
Women and men have an individual and equal right to freedom of re-
ligion. If this right is interpreted and commonly understood as the right 
to practise one’s religion, within the context of a recognised religion, and 
women are excluded from influencing the content and being a part of the 
power structure within that religion then, in effect, not only is their fun-
damental right to equality being violated but also their right to religion. 
While women may have the right to join or leave a religion, if only men 
dictate the content of that religion, they are disenfranchised within the 
religion that gives meaning to their lives. Given the influence that relig-
ion has on the lives of not only believers but society as a whole, this dis-
enfranchisement has serious repercussions for gender equality.  
This article seeks to critically analyse the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (European Court) and domestic jurisprudence to ascertain the 
extent to which the right to freedom of religion has been interpreted as  
a right of religious communities to internal autonomy, free from state 
regulation. It is asserted, within the body of this article, that to the extent 
that institutionalised religions are patriarchal, and women are unable to 
directly influence the content or structure of the religion they belong to, 
women have been effectively denied their right to freedom of religion. 
The article argues that women’s power and position within religion 
should be equivalent to men’s to ensure the equal operation of Article 9 
of the Convention between the sexes, in conjunction with Article 14. It 
therefore states that an intrinsic part of a State’s obligation to secure 
women’s equal right to freedom of religion is the facilitation of gender 
equality within religion. The right to freedom of religion is not an abso-
________________ 
4 For a full explanation of this point please see Stuart, 2008, p. 101. 
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lute right; it is subject to certain limitations in relation to public safety, 
order, health, morals or the fundamental rights of others (Article 9(2), 
Convention).5 Whilst the European Court of Human Rights (European 
Court) has allowed churches to assert their own right to freedom of re-
ligion, as the body charged with ensuring the fulfilment of human rights 
without distinction, it is asserted that States have a fundamental duty to 
limit the institutional right to freedom of religion by reference to the 
equal right of women to thought, conscience and religion and gender 
equality. The difficulty inherent in this approach is recognised and the 
article culminates by suggesting proportionate and appropriate methods 
by which a State can facilitate gender equality within religion. 
 
 
2. The Right to Freedom of Religion within  
the Council of Europe 
 
Within Article 9 of the Convention the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is phrased as a right given to all human beings; 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
This is the same in every other international instrument dealing with 
this right.6 Looking, however, at European jurisprudence it appears that 
the individual right to freedom of religion has been interpreted and un-
derstood, in the main, as the right of a religious institution to exist and 
have internal autonomy. While it is accepted that there is an individual 
right to freedom of religion, the protection afforded to the individual 
right is limited and, almost entirely, dependant on the stance of the par-
ticular State involved. As can be seen by the European Court’s judgment 
in Sahin v. Turkey,7 the Court, under the principle of subsidiarity, allows 
a State to place restrictions as long as they do not ‘entirely negate the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief.’8 This ‘laissez faire’ stance 
has been further developed in a long line of ‘veil’ cases before the Court: 
________________ 
5 Article 9(2), Convention. 
6 For example, Article 18, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 G.A. res. 
217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (UDHR); Article 18, International Covenant on Civil & 
Political Rights 1966, 99 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); Article 1, UN Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 
1981, A/RES/36/55. 
7 Sahin v. Turkey 41 EHRR 8. 
8 Ibid. at para. 102. 
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the most notable one being S.A.S v. France, where the European Court 
appears to abdicate its supervisory responsibility to pay deference to the 
unsubstantiated view of the state.  
 
The main focus of the European Court’s protection, under Article 9, appears to 
be the prevention of discrimination on the basis of religion and the protection of 
a religious community's right to autonomy in order to ensure societal peace, as 
opposed to actually ensuring an individual’s right to freedom of religion. The en-
capsulation of the substantive, as opposed to non discrimination, element of 
right to freedom of religion as an institutional right might not appear problem-
atic at first glance. To the extent that religions, and more particularly hierarchi-
cal and institutionalised religions, are patriarchal, however, women have been 
excluded from this sphere of influence and discriminated against. State policy of 
non interference in religious affairs, arising out of the judicial interpretation of 
Article 9 and the liberal notion of public/ private divide, has thereby effectively 
resulted in women being effectively denied equal enjoyment of their Article 9 
right of religion. 
 
Although the right to thought, conscience and religion is phrased as 
an individual human right, the European Court has held that a Church or 
ecclesiastical body may exercise the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the 
Convention, on behalf of its adherents.9 This allowance of a religion to be 
a holder of Article 9 rights is predicated on the assumption that an indi-
vidual’s religious life is dependent on the health of the religious commu-
nity they belong to (Evans, 1997, p. 325). This view is demonstrated in 
the European Court’s judgment in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria,10 where 
the Court stated:  
 
Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of the 
Convention must be interpreted in light of Article 11, which safeguards associa-
tive life against unjustified State interference. Seen in this perspective, the be-
liever's right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that the com-
munity will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State 
intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is in-
dispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very 
heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. It directly concerns not only the 
organisation of the community as such but also the effective enjoyment of the 
right to freedom of religion by all its active members. Were the organisational 
life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other as-
pects of the individual's freedom of religion would become vulnerable.11 
________________ 
9 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France, (2000) 9 BHRC 27 at para 72. 
10 Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria 34 EHRR 55. 
11 Ibid. at para. 62. 
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In this judgment, and others, the European Court explicitly links plu-
ralism, peace and public order within a State with the autonomous exis-
tence of religious communities. Accordingly, it delineates the limits of 
State interference with  religion by reference to the goal of religious plu-
rality or, in other words, non discrimination on the basis of religion. Tak-
ing plurality as its primary aim, the European Court has recognised, 
within article 9, that the right to religion includes the right to internal 
religious autonomy and the consequential non interference in religious 
affairs by States. 
When deciding whether a State has violated an Article 9 right the 
European Court should subject the State’s reasons and measures limit-
ing the manifestation of religion or beliefs to the test set out within Arti-
cle 9(2). Article 9(2) states that the ‘freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others.’ In determining whether a limi-
tation falls within the allowable exception the European Court decides 
within the ‘necessary to’ part of the equation, whether the State has  
a legitimate aim and if the means used to achieve that aim are propor-
tionate. The depth of critical analysis the Court will exert on the State’s 
stated legitimate aim(s) and proportionality of methods will depend on 
the extent of the margin of appreciation it feels should be given to States 
in relation to the competing interests at play.12 The European Court feels 
that ‘by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital 
forces of their countries, the national authorities are in principle better 
placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and condi-
tions.’13 In determining the proportionality of a State’s measure, a cer-
tain degree of latitude is therefore given to the State’s assessment and 
balancing of competing interests due to their inferred special knowledge 
of the domestic situation.  
‘The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the 
circumstances, the subject matter and the background’14 of the case. 
Where the issue at stake is a ‘delicate’ one, such as the protection of 
morals, and there is no common European consensus, the margin of ap-
________________ 
12 The margin of appreciation is a device by which the Court allows a State  
a certain amount of leeway in their handling of human rights issues. 
13 Frette v. France 38 EHRR 21 at para. 41. 
14 Ibid. at para. 40. 
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preciation given by the European Court is wide. The margin is also wide 
where a ‘state is required to strike a balance between competing private 
and public interests or Convention rights.’15 The margin of appreciation 
can, however, be restricted when an important facet of a person's iden-
tity16 or any feature that the Court sees as essential to the concept of  
a democratic society, is at stake. The court is not, however, consistent in 
its approach in these matters.17 
As the European Court expressly stated in Manoussakis and Others  
v. Greece,18 which concerned a limitation upon the holding of religious 
meetings by Jehovah’s Witnesses, in ‘delimiting the extent of the margin 
of appreciation [in this context, the Court had to] have regard to what 
[was] at stake, namely the need to secure true religious pluralism, an 
inherent feature of the notion of a democratic society.’19 In this case the 
European Court elaborated that considerable weight must be attached to 
the need to secure religious pluralism when it comes to determining, 
pursuant to Article 9(2), whether the restriction was proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued. The Court concluded by stating that it would 
subject the justification of the State to a very strict scrutiny in relation to 
determining this point. It duly did so and held, in this case, that the 
means were disproportionate to the aim pursued.  
This doctrine of strict scrutiny has, however, only been applied in re-
lation to assuring plurality of religion; it has not been utilised in deter-
mining limitations on an individual’s right to manifest their religious 
beliefs. This can be clearly seen in S.A.S. v. France. Although this case in-
volved a plurality element, in that the full face ban prevents certain 
women from expressing their personality and beliefs, the European 
Court found that the principle of interaction, as defined by the French 
Parliament, was essential for pluralism and tolerance so denied plurality 
of dress. As the dissenting judgment infers the ban does not so much en-
courage plurality as  eliminate a cause of tension by banning the full veil 
and hereby reduce plurality, which goes directly against the Court’s own 
________________ 
15 Evans v. UK 46 EHRR 34 at para. 77. 
16 Dudgeon v. UK A. 45 (1981); 4 EHRR 149. 
17 Looking at S.A.S. v. France it can be seen that although the wearing of the veil 
was an important facet of these women’s identity, the court did not narrow the mar-
gin of appreciation given to France on this basis. 
18 Manoussakis and Others v. Greece 1996-IV; 23 EHRR 387. 
19 Ibid. at para. 44. 
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jurisprudence20 and their protection of plurality in relation to the insti-
tutional right to freedom of religion.  
The European Court has explicitly stated that Article 9 does not pro-
tect every act motivated by religion or belief.21 
 
In order to count as a “manifestation” within the meaning of Article 9, the act in 
question must be intimately linked to the religion or belief. An example would 
be an act of worship or devotion which forms part of the practice of a religion or 
belief in a generally recognised form. However, the manifestation of religion or 
belief is not limited to such acts; the existence of a sufficiently close and direct 
nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined on the 
facts of each case. In particular, there is no requirement on the applicant to es-
tablish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in 
question.22 
 
The European Court’s judgment in Eweida23 appears to signal some 
movement away from merely protecting traditional and ‘institution led’ 
manifestations to also covering more personalised expressions of belief. 
As S.A.S and Sahin show though, there is a dearth of protection of such 
manifestations where the state itself is directly involved in the interfer-
ence and the interference accords with the constitutional model governing 
relations between the State and religious denominations. The European 
Court expressly accords special importance to the role of the national de-
cision-making body, where questions concerning the relationship be-
tween the State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democ-
ratic society may reasonably differ widely.24 Thecourt, in this situation, 
gives considerable deference to the stated legitimate aims of the state 
and does not tend to robustly apply the proportionality test. 
In S.A.S, the European Court allowed France a very wide margin of 
appreciation, in relation to its ban on the wearing of a full veil, due to its 
assessment that there was a lack of common consensus in Council of 
Europe states25 and the fact the ban was the result of a democratic proc-
________________ 
20 See the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jaderblom in S.A.S 
v. France at para. 14. 
21 Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia 45 EHRR 31. 
22 Eweida v. UK (2013) 57 E.H.R.R. 8 at para. 82. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Sindicatul Pastorul cel Bun v. Romania [2014] I.R.L.R. 49 at para. 138. 
25 The dissenting judgment challenges this, in para. 19, as 45 states out of 47 
have not legislated to prohibit full-face veil and there is wide soft law evidence op-
posing such bans. 
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ess. After the application of such a margin of appreciation, however, the 
court declined to then go on and properly apply the usual necessary and 
proportionate test; it simply gave lip service to it, leading to a lack of ef-
fective oversight. The European Court accepted that the impact of the 
ban on those that wear the Burka in France was and would be signifi-
cant. In fact they specifically recognised that those who have chosen to 
wear the full veil due to their religious beliefs  
 
are thus confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the effect of 
isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing the exercise 
of their freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right to respect for their pri-
vate life. It is also understandable that the women concerned may perceive the 
ban as a threat to their identity. 
 
The court also accepted that the number of women wearing the 
burka vis a vis the population as a whole was miniscule. It stated that it 
‘may thus seem excessive to respond to such a situation by imposing  
a blanket ban.’ Even taking on board the fact that research showed that 
the ban had increased instances of Islamophobia, and the views of other 
human rights bodies opposing such a ban, the European Court of Human 
Rights still, however, declined to protect the women’s article 8, 9 &14 
rights. It did so not for any defined public safety reason or other strong 
competing human right but on behalf of the nebulous concept of ‘the 
right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living to-
gether easier.’ As the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and 
Jaderblom identify, it is difficult to see how this concept fits within the 
stated exceptions falling within article 9(2) or 8 (2). France’s argument 
should, therefore, have fallen at this hurdle, as having no legitimate aim. 
Even if it was accepted that the notion of “living together” was a legiti-
mate aim, the court, itself, indicated that the concept was flexible and 
open to abuse. Having accepted that, the European Court did not go on to 
require evidence to support the fact that the banning the burka was ac-
tually necessary to have meaningful personal relations and assess its 
proportionality in a meaningful way. While the Court stated that it 
would ‘engage in a careful examination of the necessity of the impugned 
limitation,’ it did not fulfil this self-imposed duty. 
The Court’s judgment in S.A.S., appears to cede an even wider margin 
of appreciation to the state and, arguably, breaches the boundaries set in 
Sahin by not only reducing visual plurality in French society, but by ne-
gating either the women affected’s rights to a life outside the home or 
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their freedom of religion, depending on what each woman chooses to do. 
This is a highly worrying development, which demonstrates a lack of 
effective supervision by the court where an individual’s, particularly  
a women’s, right to religion is in the balance alongside an opposing state 
stance. This can be sharply contrasted with the European Court’s stance 
in relation to the protection of a religious group’s internal autonomy. 
Although States currently have a limited right to interfere with the 
internal affairs of  ‘State’ or established churches within their jurisdic-
tion,26 non-established religions are given the right to autonomy in their 
internal decision making and structure.27  
This ‘non-interference by a State in a religious community’ stance 
taken by the European Court, and the former Commission, has had  
a huge impact on the individual's right to freedom of religion. It has, in 
effect, meant that when an individual becomes part of a religion they are 
deemed to voluntarily give up their personal right to freedom of con-
science and belief.28 In X v. Denmark,29 the European Commission stated 
that a ‘priest’s’ ‘individual freedom of thought, conscience or religion is 
exercised at the moment they accept or refuse employment as clergy-
men, and their right to leave the church guarantees their freedom of re-
ligion in case they oppose its teachings.’30 It followed this sentiment by 
stating that ‘the church is not obliged to provide religious freedom to its 
servants and members.’31 More recently the European Court has reiter-
ated this sentiment in Sindicatul Pastorul cel Bun v. Romania.32 
 
Article 9 of the Convention does not guarantee any right to dissent within a reli-
gious body; in the event of a disagreement over matters of doctrine or organisa-
tion between a religious community and one of its members, the individual’s 
freedom of religion is exercised through his freedom to leave the community. 
 
________________ 
26 Knudson v. Norway D.R. 42 (1985). 
27 Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, ibid. 
28 X v. Denmark D.R. 5 (1976); Karlsson v. Sweden Application 12356/86, Deci-
sion of 8 September 1988; Knudson v. Norway. Interestingly enough the European 
Court’s stance has in fact meant that the leadership of religious communities can 
ignore ‘dissenters’ within their religion thereby paving the way for ‘unity’ of beliefs 
within a religious community. 
29 X v. Denmark, ibid. 
30 Ibid. at 158.  
31 Ibid. 
32 [2014] I.R.L.R. 49, at 137. 
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Members of a religion therefore have no right to manifest their own 
individual religious views, different from those dictated by the leaders of 
the religion, within that religion. There is no right to freedom of con-
science and belief, expression or equality within a religion. A religious 
community has the right to ignore the wishes and rights of their adher-
ents without interference by the law. Effectively this means that once an 
individual is part of a certain religion, their only option is to accept the 
creed, rules and internal workings of that religion, or leave. This can be 
clearly seen in the cases of Fernandez Martinez v. Spain,33 Obst v. Ger-
many,34 and Schuth v. Germany,35 where ministers of religion were dis-
missed from their ‘employment,’ with Obst also being excommunicated, 
due to behaviour that ‘dissented’ from the official stance of the religion in 
question. As Sunder elucidates, this approach results in a legally author-
ised exile for those who openly disagree with the group’s traditional or 
patriarchal views (Sunder, 2001, p. 542). The liberty versus equality 
paradigm has therefore paved the way for the rise of a new right to ex-
clude an individual, not from an association's membership, but rather, 
from an association’s meaning (Sunder, 2001, p. 542). The European 
Court not only permits this exclusion and suppression but actively pro-
tects the religious authorities’ right to do so. This is aptly demonstrated 
within the case of Sindicatul Pastorul cel Bun v. Romania,36 where the 
European Court reiterated the importance of a religious group’s auton-
omy and demonstrated the primacy given to protecting this as opposed 
to an individual’s right. The court stipulates that: 
 
Respect for the autonomy of religious communities recognised by the State im-
plies, in particular, that the State should accept the right of such communities to 
react, in accordance with their own rules and interests, to any dissident move-
ments emerging within them that might pose a threat to their cohesion, image 
or unity.37 
 
In fact, the European Court sees the state as being ‘neutral’ when  
it allows those in power within a religion to supress any alternative 
________________ 
33 (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 3. 
34 Application No. 42/03 (2010) found at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ 
pages/search.aspx#{"dmdocnumber":["874337"],"itemid":["001-100463"]} [last acc 
essed March 2015]. 
35 (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 32. 
36 [2014] I.R.L.R. 49. 
37 Ibid., at 165. 
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views.38 It does not appear to appreciate that this is not neutrality per se 
but instead siding with the status quo and, indeed, can lead to suppres-
sion of human rights.  
This suppression of dissent approach offering a choice of acceptance 
or removal is problematic. The allowance of this policy, by the European 
Court is rooted in the liberal concept that an autonomous individual 
makes choices on rational grounds; this is however only a concept and 
not one borne out in reality. The concept does not make allowance for 
the fact that individuals are members of various groups and rarely fully 
independent from their surroundings. It does not take account of the 
complex relationship between a believer and their religion. The question 
of choice is contextual. Many individuals are born into a religion and  
a religious community; membership therefore becomes part of those 
individuals identity before the concept of choice is introduced. Even 
where the choice of religion comes later it is difficult, if not nigh on im-
possible, for some individuals, particularly when their life revolves 
around a religious community or family, to ‘cut’ that religion out of their 
sense of identity and conception of life. To many members of a religion 
their religion is the foundation of their sense of self, the source of truth 
and salvation. Although they may disagree with certain tenets of their 
church, it is an important part of their identity. To leave, as a result of 
discriminatory/ patriarchal practices and structures, could seriously 
affect their spiritual wellbeing.39 Leaving is also impractical where a per-
son has little or no social, economic or personal independence from the 
religious group (Evans, 2001, p. 129; see also Coomaraswamy, 2002,  
p. 483). This is especially pertinent for women who, due to their status 
and position within society, are more likely to be dependent upon their 
family and religious community. In Europe, this is more likely to be an 
issue within minority religions or immigrant communities. Some relig-
ions use the threat of exclusion to prevent dissent and bring dissenters 
back in line. The purpose of the Jewish device of shunning or excommu-
nication, for example, has been said to ‘serve notice… that this conduct is 
unacceptable and also, secondarily, to encourage the violator to return 
to the community’ (Broyde, 1996) and, presumably in this context, obey 
the discriminatory rules. In a closed and tightly knit community, exclu-
________________ 
38 Ibid., n. 43 at 166. 
39 For an example of how religious women want to stay within a religion regard-
less of its discriminatory practises but wish that it would become more internally 
‘equal,’ see Preston, 2003, p. 185.  
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sion from that community, due to a desire not to be bound by patriarchal 
rules, can be a severe penalty and one which many women do not wish 
to pay. The issue at the heart of this article is not that women wish, nec-
essarily, to leave their religion but rather that they wish to be treated 
equally and have a say in the content and structure of that religion.  
The European human rights system is not alone in its treatment of 
religious communities as autonomous entities. Human rights jurispru-
dence and international policy continues to define religion as a sover-
eign, extra legal, jurisdiction in which inequality is not only accepted but 
expected (Sunder, 2003, p. 1401). This may be due to the fact that relig-
ion and human rights could be seen to be competing ideologies. To the 
extent that religious precepts are seen as divine law, human rights and 
religion will clash. States that have a religious foundation, or religions 
themselves, are bound to argue that there is a natural law order that su-
persedes human rights and, in the event of a conflict, religion prevails 
(Coomaraswamy, 1999, p. 82). The fact, however, remains that states 
create the law that is abided by in their jurisdictions. The Council of 
Europe states, and indeed all states through membership of the UN, have 
chosen the human rights model and as such it is submitted that claims of 




3. Status of Women within Religion 
 
Religious institutions are, on the whole, male dominated patriarchal 
institutions that continue to perpetrate discrimination against women. 
Although women make up the majority of believers, they do not hold 
positions of real power within most major religions.40 It is encouraging 
that many Christian religions are coming around to the idea of women as 
ministers of the faith. The Church of Scotland has ordained women as 
ministers since 1968, while the Church of England has ordained women 
as ministers since 1992. Since November 2014 it has also allowed 
women to become Bishops since November 2014, with the first female 
________________ 
40 In all the major religions, there are more women than men and more women 
in evangelical groups than mainstream religious groups, Boyle and Sheen, 1997. In 
fact studies consistently show that women, on a whole, are more religious than men, 
see for conclusions on the findings of the world value surveys, Stark, 2002, p. 495. 
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bishop ordained in January 2015.41 While some religions are starting to 
show small signs of growth and acceptance of true gender equality, the 
pace of change is, however, slow. Even where religions have accepted 
that women may be ministers, gender discrimination and the side lining 
of women still occurs. Although the percentage of women incumbents 
within the Church of England has increased since 2002 by 41%, women 
still only make up a seventh of full time incumbent posts. Women, how-
ever, make up over  half of those in part-time positions and those roles 
that do not receive a stipend.42 It is notable that women are not gener-
ally selected to serve in large, growing or high profile churches and only 
11% of the senior clergy are female (Voas, 2007, p. 4).  
Only a few of the main religions accept that women can be official in-
terpreters of their sacred texts and an official intermediary between God 
and the faithful. Up until very recently women were denied an education 
in the holy texts of Islam and Judaism and, in many States, still are. 
Where only men are the authorative interpreters of religious texts, 
women cannot contribute to any development of progressive, gender 
equal, interpretations. There has been no female Grand sheik of Al-
Azhar,43 no women mufti and no women ayatollah. Women therefore 
lack the institutional credentials and prestigious titles that can lend au-
thority to men’s pronouncements on behalf of Islam (Mayer, 1999, n. 4 at 
184). This is the current position in the majority of religions. Most relig-
ions also claim that only men possess the ability necessary to communi-
cate with and be God's representative on earth. A considerable number 
of Christian denominations do not allow women to be ministers of relig-
ion; Orthodox Judaism and most branches of Islam likewise prevent such 
roles for women. Even in religions where female priests are permitted, 
they only exist in small numbers and within certain denominations.44 
________________ 
41 Libby Lane was consecrated as a Bishop on 26th January 2015 information 
found at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30974547 [last accessed March 
2015]. 
42 Statistics for Mission 2012: Minister, published 2013 by Archbishops’ Council, 
Research and Statistics, Central Secretariat found at https://www.churchofengland. 
org/about-us/facts-stats/research-statistics.aspx [last accessed April 2015] 
43 The Al-Azhar in Cairo is regarded as the pre-eminent centre of theological 
learning and, therefore, interpretation of the Sunni Muslim faith. The Grand Sheik is 
the leader of the Al-Azhar. He is perceived as the foremost religious legal expert in 
the Sunni sect. He advises States on religious matters and oversees an extensive 
network of educational institutes, worldwide. 
44 See the ‘gender’ section in the country reports within Boyle & Sheen, 1997. 
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Certain religions have even rescinded their former policy of allowing 
women ministers (Boyle & Sheen, 1997, p. 75).  
Religions are not, generally, democratic organisations; as women are 
not in positions of power their voices and views go unheard. Women are 
therefore not able to influence the content of their religion or shape 
their role within it. Although many religions are increasingly paying lip 
service to the concept of gender equality, they do so within the limited 
concept of complementary roles for men and women and deny the ap-
plicability of substantive gender equality.45 The older assertion of the 
natural inferiority of women has now been replaced by the anthropo-
logical model of mutual complementarity (Eyden, 2001). In this model 
men and women have separate normative roles, with human beings only 
finding perfection within this duality. However, while the roles are seen 
as mutually complementary, men and women are equal only in terms of 
dignity. In reality the specific characteristics attributed, and roles given 
to each gender, result in male dominance. The justifications for discrimi-
nation have changed but the end point of male superiority has not. 
Male patriarchal attitudes are prevalent and protected within relig-
ion. This causes problems not only for those disenfranchised women 
within a religion but also for women's status and equality in society as  
a whole. The precepts and attitudes of religion pervade society. There is 
no wall separating the public and private life and thoughts of an individ-
ual. While many States might pride themselves on being secular or neu-
tral as regards religion, the values of the dominant religions are part and 
parcel of and underpin the culture of a State. Religion and culture are 
intertwined. One influences the other. In a well-functioning society they 
walk hand in hand embodying the same values and ‘good practices.’ Ad-
vances or changes in values may initially begin in one but eventually be-
come part of the other too. Discriminatory attitudes in one sphere there-
fore impact negatively in the other. The power of religion over the lives 
of women has had, and continues to have, a formative influence on their 
roles in group and collective identities, in family and the community 
(Sheen, 2004, p. 515). Women’s lesser status in religion compounds 
their inferior status within society as a whole.  
 
________________ 
45 See the Apostolic Letter, Mulieris Dignitatem: On the Dignity and Vocation of 
Women (1998), in relation to the Catholic Church’s stance on this. See also Mayer, 
1999, which gives examples of influential Muslim views on the ‘natural’ different 
roles of men and women; Fawzy, 2004, p. 24. 
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4. Struggle for Gender Equality within Religion 
 
Women and men, both inside and outside religion, have struggled to 
put gender equality on the religious agenda. There has been a mixed re-
action to their efforts, with the leadership of many religions proving re-
sistant to change. Most strands of Islam are unwilling, as yet, to engage 
with the process of obtaining gender equality. Although Judaism is more 
receptive to the concept of gender equality, its more Orthodox strands 
are impervious to change in this area. One can take the Roman Catholic 
religion as an example of religion's reluctance to accept and implement 
gender equality. 
Although in the 1970s there were signs that the Catholic Church 
might be close to accepting women as priests, this move towards gender 
equality was firmly quashed by the Vatican.46 The movement for female 
ordination and dissent within the Church grew regardless. Pope John 
Paul II, in an attempt to quell this growing tide of support for female or-
dination, invoked the concept of divine androcentrism. He presented as 
a definite core doctrine of the Catholic Church the view that women can-
not be ordained as priests.47 When this failed to eradicate support for 
female ordination, the Vatican instituted a requirement that all priests 
and theologians must take an oath of loyalty obliging them to support 
certain definitive doctrinal pronouncements, one of which is the non 
ordination of women.48 The priesthood and authoritive interpretators of 
God's will within the Catholic Church have been effectively silenced and 
gender equality prevented by the imposition of authority by the ruling 
elite. The current Pope, Pope Francis, has however indicated a softening 
in the Catholic Church’s approach to gender equality. While reiterating 
that “the reservation of the priesthood to males, as a sign of Christ the 
________________ 
46 At the request of the bishop’s synod in 1971, Pope Paul VI set up a special 
commission to study the function of women in society, although not to discuss 
women’s ministers, and a biblical commission to look at the question from a scrip-
tural angle. The final report was favourable to female ordination, with the majority 
finding that the Church could ordain women. In response the report was quashed 
and withheld from publication. Pope Paul VI in fact went against the main tenet of 
the report and sanctioned a doctrinal document against women’s ordination: Inter 
Insigniores. This document did little to suppress the growing tide of opinion in fa-
vour of female ordination. 
47 The Pope John Paul II proclaimed this in his thesis Ordinatio Sacerdotalis: On 
Reserving Priestly Ordinance to Men Alone (1994). 
48 This can be found in the Ad Tuendam Fidem (1998). 
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spouse who gives himself in the Eucharist, is not a question open to dis-
cussion,” he has indicated a widening of the role and position of women 
within the church and a movement away from power being concen-
trated purely in the priesthood.49  
It could be debated whether, and the extent to which, religious 
women wish to be ‘rescued’ from misogynist attitudes within their relig-
ion. Certainly this question could be derived from cases such as Sahin, 
where the female believer, in question, wished to abide by a religious 
practice that the State and others have viewed as discriminatory. It 
could be argued that it is the individual believer's choice whether they 
abide by such discriminatory practices i.e. that equality means the ability 
to choose what you believe in and practise and, from an individual per-
spective, this surely must be correct. In fact the European Court ex-
pressly agrees with this standpoint within its judgment in SAS. This does, 
however, beg the question, what is ‘free’ choice. As stated by Preston, 
‘(i)t is understandable and legitimate for a woman to want to fit in with 
other adherents of their faith. In addition a woman may value and re-
spect the wishes of her parents, husband, children or others to conform 
to the cultural norms.’ To what extent is a woman given a free choice in 
whether they abide by a discriminatory religious practice, where there is 
no alternative in how they demonstrate that they are a ‘good’ adherent 
of their faith? 
Many could point to the rigorous defence of male only priests by  
a number of women, including, in the past, a UK prominent politician, Ann 
Widdecombe,50 as indication that some religious women do not wish to 
have a secular version of gender equality thrust upon them. This is un-
doubtedly true. Equality, however, is not a merely secular concept but one 
at the heart of all religions. Ms Widdecombe, when leaving the Church of 
England over its ordination of women, accused the Church of ‘promoting 
political correctness above the very clear teachings of Scripture’ (BBC, 
1992). To what extent however are the ‘Scriptures clear’ and equality 
merely ‘political correctness’? The ‘male’ interpretation of the bible, and 
other sacred books, is the official interpretation and taught as such.  
________________ 
49 Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii Gaudium, of the Holy Father Francis, (2013) 
para 113-114. Found at http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhorta 
tions/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-
gaudium.html [last accessed April 2015]. 
50 Ann Widdecombe left the Church of England in 1992 due to its allowance of 
women to become clergy.  
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A process of socialisation takes place in every community where the 
members are taught and internalise a set of complex rules and religious 
‘understandings.’ Institutionalised religions tend to promote unthinking 
obedience to the creed and rules they set. Where a person is taught that 
there is only one ‘right’ interpretation of the Scriptures, and only by ac-
cepting that can you be of that religion, to what extent is it really possi-
ble to question what is seen as unquestionable, i.e. the superiority of 
men in religion and God being made in man’s image? (Shaheed, 2001). 
As McClain comments how voluntary is an acceptance of a religious 
‘norm’ if the adherents have been socialised into accepting it and there is 
little practical alternative? (McClain, 2004, 1583). Surely it is only when 
there are competing legitimate religious interpretations that a real choice 
is possible? As the organisation Women Living Under Muslim Laws ar-
gues, it is only when women start assuming the right to define for them-
selves the parameters of their own identity and stop accepting uncondi-
tionally and without question what is presented as the ‘correct’ religion 
that they will be able to effectively challenge the corpus of laws and gen-
der constructs thrust upon them. This does not mean that all women must 
feel the same way or hold the same views within a religion. It merely 
means that each man and woman should be able to choose what they be-
lieve in and not prevent others from exercising their equal religious rights, 
in relation to themselves. Not every religious woman will want to be  
a Minister of the faith, or influence the content of their religion, but every 
woman, like every man, should be given the choice to do so. It is this abil-
ity to choose free from barriers that is at the core of equality. 
Religions are not a mass of people with one viewpoint or belief that 
their leaders espouse. They are a collection of different thoughts and 
beliefs, the holders of which all identify themselves as ‘being of that re-
ligion.’ What ‘being of that religion’ means however differs for each indi-
vidual; human beliefs are individualised, as are human rights. Looking at 
religious beliefs in this context, the law’s current approach to the right to 
freedom of religion is highly problematic.  
 
 
5. Practical Effect of the Current Legal Approach to the Right  
to Freedom of Religion 
 
The harsh choice of ‘take it or leave it,’ in relation to membership of 
religion, means in effect that women have to choose between their relig-
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ion and community or equality. Individuals do not however merely have 
one badge of identity but many, each enriching that person’s life. Women 
often do not wish to leave their religious community to gain equality; 
they wish to be recognised as fully functioning and equal members of 
their religious community. States have a responsibility to respect and 
ensure that women have this right. Religious women do not wish to 
damage their religious institution, in fact when it is criticised externally 
they will protect it. What they do desire is the opportunity to use, to the 
full extent, their capabilities to nurture and enrich their religion.51 They 
cannot fully do this in their present disempowered state. 
The judicial tendency, of not just the European Court but most do-
mestic jurisdictions,52 to carve the religious sphere out of the operation 
of judicial scrutiny is hindering the process of gender equality and is at 
the heart of why women do not currently have a right to freedom of re-
ligion. States and judicial authorities are implicitly allowing religions to 
continue to discriminate against women and deny their female believers 
an equal say in deciding the identity, content and structure of that relig-
ion. The liberal stance of neutrality and non interference towards relig-
ion is not neutral; it merely allows the power balance to remain heavily 
tilted towards male dominance within religion. 
 
 
6. The ‘Liberal’ Stance of Legal Neutrality towards Religion 
 
The catchword used to justify legal neutrality in relation to religion 
is plurality. A plurality of ideas is also seen by liberals as necessary for 
the actual evolution of society. Part of the premise behind religions be-
ing given internal autonomy is to ensure a plurality of ideas and there-
fore liberty within society. Academics such as Galston explicitly recom-
mend pursuing a policy of maximum feasible accommodation in relation 
to religion. They expressly state that patriarchal gender relations should 
be allowed to persist to enable the maximisation of liberty (Galston, 
1999, p. 875; Ahdar, 2001, p. 276). In some academic writings there is 
suggestion that human rights, particularly gender equality, might stifle 
liberty (Ahdar, 2001, p. 276). It is interesting however that, although 
________________ 
51 See Greenberg, 1999 in relation to this protective instinct. 
52 See Hill, 2001, at 409; Minnerath, 2004, n. 63 at 291 and Evans, 1997, Chapter 
11 for details of domestic jurisprudence in this area.  
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liberty is presented as the favoured end point for society as a whole, lib-
erty, in this context, is implicitly a purely male right. This viewpoint ac-
cepts that the views of women, half the human race, can be ignored and 
suppressed. 
Much of what is behind this championing of ‘liberty’ against claims of 
gender equality is actually the defence of legally sanctioned male be-
liever privilege. There is little realisation, within this reasoning, that non 
interference and maximum feasible accommodation can actually prevent 
the proliferation of ideas and the evolution of religion. In effect it gives 
exclusive rights to the leaders of religion to define the religions creed 
and views and silence or exclude those who disagree (Sunder, 2001, n. 
49 at 515). By buying into the vision of ‘an organised religious commu-
nity based on identical or at least substantially similar views,’53 States 
and judicial authorities cede the ultimate power to decide the creeds and 
internal workings of the religion to the leaders of a religion. They cede 
this power to religious leaders without any consideration of whether the 
religious authorities consult with or actually represent the views of their 
members. State power is used here in the service of religious leaders to 
impose patriarchal and hierarchical norms, for those leaders’ benefit, at 
the expense of the basic right to equality of the community’s female 




7. States’ Legal Obligations in Relation to Gender Equality 
 
The current legal approach to the right of religion effectively denies 
women an equal say in the composition and content of their religion. It is 
hereby asserted that such an approach violates the legal obligation 
States and the international community have to ensure gender equality 
and a woman’s equal right to freedom of religion. States have a duty of 
due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused 
by gender inequality or any violation of a woman’s human rights by the 
acts of private persons or entities.54 The European Court has recognised 
________________ 
53 X v. Denmark, ibid. 
54 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 at para. 8 and Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, IACtHR 
Series C 4 (1988) at para. 172. 
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this duty within its own jurisprudence as can be clearly seen, in relation 
to gender equality, in Opuz v. Turkey.55 In this case the European Court 
considered the obligation of States to ‘take all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, cus-
toms and practices which constitute discrimination against women’ as 
set out in Article 2(f) of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women 1979 (CEDAW) in relation to the phe-
nomenon of violence against women. It also referred to Article 2(e) of 
CEDAW, which explicitly places a duty on States to eliminate discrimina-
tion by any person, organisation or enterprise. A State’s obligation to 
ensure that religious beliefs, customs and practices are modified to pre-
vent discrimination has been reiterated within the CEDAW Committee 
and Human Rights Committee jurisprudence56 and General Comments 
and in UN and the Council of Europe resolutions.57 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that 
the contracting parties must secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Article 14 elucidates 
that these rights and freedoms must be enjoyed without discrimination 
on the basis of sex. This means that the right to freedom of religion and 
belief in Article 9 (1) of the Convention must be guaranteed and pro-
tected in law and in practice, for both men and women, on the same 
terms and without discrimination. It is therefore asserted that the pre-
sent political and legal stance of neutrality and non interference in rela-
tion to religion has to change in light of this legal obligation. If religious 
________________ 
55 Opuz v. Turkey 50 EHRR 28. 
56 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding 
Observations: Algeria, U.N. Doc. A/54/38 (1999) para. 70 & 71; Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations: India, U.N. 
Doc. A/55/38, (2000), para. 60; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, Concluding Observations: Bangladesh, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/SR.654 
at para. 62 (2005); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
Communication No. 12/2007, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/44/D/12/2007 (2007); Conclud-
ing Observations of the Human Rights Committee regarding Morocco, 1 November 
1999, CCPR/C/79/Add.113 at para. 12; Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee regarding Kuwait, 27 July 2000, CCPR/CO/69/KWT. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28: Equality of rights between men and 
women (article 3), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000), para. 21. 
57 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/40, 19 April 2005, 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/40 and Council of Europe Resolution 1464, both attest that States 
should take all appropriate measures to counter intolerance and gender discrimina-
tion based on religion or belief.  
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institutions or beliefs are internally discriminating against or causing 
discrimination against women, then States are obliged to take action to 
prevent such discrimination. Although it is appreciated that the spiritual 
beliefs of another can be integral to their very person, claims of religion, 
which impact on the basic rights of others, must be subjected to critical 
analysis.  
While it may be acceptable to argue over the precise content of  
a human right, it is clear that, regardless of the actual specifics, each hu-
man right must be ensured without distinction as to sex, or indeed any 
of the other ‘protected grounds.’58 This means that, in order to fulfil the 
non distinction condition, the content of the rights themselves must be 
non discriminatory. Following on from this reasoning, all human rights, 
including the right to freedom of religion, should be interpreted in light 
of the non distinction norm. The right to freedom of religion therefore 
must be looked at through the prism of gender equality (Stuart, 2008,  
p. 101). Women’s right to religion is equal to that of men. Although 
states can and should allow religions internal autonomy, they still have  
a supervisory role to play in order to guarantee that gender equality is 
being ensured within religion and religious communities. This is not as 
fundamental a change as it may appear to be. Liberal theory, which un-
derpins a state’s neutral stance in the private sphere, already allows for 
the fulfilment of gender equality within religion. Rawls’ ‘principles of 
justice’ guarantee the ‘basic rights and liberties’ of individuals within the 
‘social world’ and thereby religion. In fact, Rawls actually states that ‘be-
cause churches…are associations within the basic structure, they must 
adjust to the requirements that this structure imposes in order to estab-
lish background justice’ (Rawls, 1996, p. 261). On this view, the auton-
omy of such associations is restricted by reference to ‘basic equal liber-
ties… and fair equality of opportunity’ and the basic rights and liberties 
of an individual are guaranteed (Rawls, 1996, p. 261). Liberal theory 
therefore already embraces the idea that religious autonomy does not 
include the right to discriminate on the basis of sex.  
Once it is accepted that religious autonomy does not include the 
right to discriminate on the basis of sex, the next question to be posed is 
________________ 
58 The author would like to iterate that although she is making an argument on 
the basis of gender equality, the premise that she is putting forward is applicable 
across the ‘protected grounds’ such as race, colour, sexual orientation, language etc. 
The content of all human rights must be interpreted in light of this entire duty re non 
discrimination.   
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how can gender equality be ensured within the right to freedom of relig-
ion and therefore within religions themselves? This is obviously a very 
difficult question, to be approached with sensitivity, but is not one that 
can simply be ignored. 
 
 
8. Methods for Instituting Change within Religion 
 
It is true that ‘by its very nature, and in order to influence effectively 
the moral convictions and daily behaviour of those who subscribe to it, 
religious belief must be voluntarily adopted and maintained’ (An-Na’im, 
1996, n. 5 at 339). Change has to come from within for it to make a real 
difference, whether the change is being made by a person or an organi-
sation. In order for women to be truly equal within a religion, those 
within that religion must therefore accept the concept of gender equal-
ity, with all of its resultant implications. Both An-Na’im (1991) and 
Coomaraswamy (2002, p. 483) are correct in insisting that change 
within a religion can only really occur through internal dialogue. At pre-
sent however, although Council of Europe states have accepted that 
women and men are equal, those in positions of authority within some 
religions still appear unwilling to initiate a process of dialogue and 
change towards gender equality. Religious authorities tend to be a self-
perpetuating male elite over which the religious community usually has 
little control. Like any in power, they resist reform ifs it is not in their 
interest. An upheaval of gender hierarchy would shake the core of not 
only religious doctrinal symbolism of androcentric gender models (Bør-
resen, 2004, n. 63 at 552) but also the power relations they support. 
Seen in this light gender equality is a dangerous premise that would in-
volve fundamental changes to the structure, composition and official 
views of most religions. This thereby threatens the position and power 
base of the current elite. It is therefore unsurprising that religions do not 
acknowledge the right of women to be a part of their religion on an equal 
basis to men; those in positions of power are reliant on the subordina-
tion of women to retain that power. Internal change is unlikely to occur 
in these circumstances without outside state pressure and ‘interference’ 
or huge ructions from within the religion. Where those in power within  
a religion are reluctant to initiate change, states must step forward and 
play their part in encouraging and supporting those religions in this 
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process of change towards gender equality.59 Religious institutions and 
leaders need to be encouraged to embrace their golden rule of ‘doing 
unto others as you would have done unto yourself’60 and bringing into 
fruition the fundamental precept of equality that lies at the heart of each 
religion.61 As stated by Stephen Barton 
 
In the sphere of gender relations… the great irony is that the Christian ideals of 
freedom reconciliation and equality are being discovered and practiced more 




9. Instituting Change through Education 
 
States can help facilitate religious change, thereby satisfying their in-
ternational and regional legal obligation to ‘ensure’ non discrimination 
in the operation of human rights, in a number of different ways; one of 
which is through education. Religious education is key to equality within 
religion as it is key to equality within society as a whole. Notions of infe-
riority and inequality are taught. If, instead, one teaches gender equality 
the battle is almost won. Religious education takes place in families, 
schools, communities and within the ‘church’ itself. Although the State 
traditionally only has direct influence over education within schools, this 
is a good starting point. 
At present there is considerable variety in the approaches taken by 
States to education in the field of religion and conviction (Plesner, 2004, 
n. 63 at 796). The UN Special Rapporteur’s survey and report on reli-
________________ 
59 It has been suggested that given the difficulties and slow pace of cultural 
change, gender equality can only really occur through a progressive realisation of 
rights. While the law states differently and women may wish that it were otherwise, 
this approach, in reality, is probably correct in relation to changes in both culture 
and religion. Coomaraswamy, 2002, n. 90 at 509. 
60 This ‘Golden Rule’ can be found in the Declaration Towards a Global Ethic, and 
the attached Principles of a Global Ethic, as signed in 1993, in the Second World Par-
liament of Religions, by the vast majority of religious representatives. A copy of the 
Declaration & Principles can be found by accessing http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/parliame.htm & http://www.religioustolerance.org/parl_rt1.htm. 
For more information please see Tahzib, 1996, at 18.  
61 See Arat, 2000, at 69, in relation to the fact that equality lies at the heart of the 
Koran. 
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gious education62 recommended that religious education should include 
education on a range of religions and be focused on the aims of toler-
ance, non discrimination and respect for human rights. This is not sim-
ply a recommendation; the duty of non discrimination in Article 14 of 
the Convention is equally applicable in relation to the right of education 
contained within Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention. Council of 
Europe member states therefore have a legal duty to ensure that reli-
gious education teaching is in conformity with gender equality princi-
ples, as pointed out in the Council of Europe Resolution 1464.63 This 
resolution elaborates on the content of this state duty by explicitly stat-
ing that states should fight against religiously motivated stereotypes of 
male and female roles from an early age, including within schools.64 Ar-
ticle 10, CEDAW, specifically requires states to eliminate any stereo-
typed concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all 
forms of education by, in particular, the revision of textbooks and school 
programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods. In order to pro-
mote religious tolerance and equality, in all its strands, religious educa-
tion should be a part of mainstream education. Textbooks need to advo-
cate a gender equal perspective and help to foster a person’s critical 
evaluation skills. Teachers should also be properly trained to teach reli-
gious education in a tolerant and non discriminatory way taking human 
rights, and in particular gender equality, into account.  
It is clear that the development of an individual’s critical thinking is  
a key educational goal.65 The development and application of critical 
thinking and evaluation within religious education is crucial for the at-
tainment of gender equality and the strengthening of individual belief. It 
is only when women start assuming the right to define for themselves 
the parameters of their own identity and stop accepting unconditionally 
and without question what is presented to them as the ‘right’ role or re-
ligious interpretation that they can effectively challenge and change the 
beliefs and practices hemming them in (Shaheed, 1994). This is true also 
for men; gender equality is also their right. A shift in roles can only occur 
with support from both genders. It is by critically analysing religious 
________________ 
62 Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance “Racial 
Discrimination, Religious Intolerance and Education”, 3 May 2001, A/CONF.189/ 
PC.2/22. 
63 Council of Europe Resolution 1464, ibid; Articles 5 and 10 CEDAW. 
64 Council of Europe Resolution 1464, ibid. at para. 6. 
65 For the position in Europe, please see Plesner, 2004. 
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gender stereotypes and interpretations of sacred texts that gender dis-
crimination can be identified and rectified. Major religions have such  
a broad repository of positions and beliefs that they can legitimise any 
course of action. Islam has been said to be 
 
like any religion, a reservoir of values, symbols and ideas from which it is possi-
ble to derive a contemporary politics and social code: the answer as to why this 
or that interpretation was put upon Islam resides therefore not in the religion 
and its texts itself, but in the contemporary needs of those articulating Islamic 
politics (Halliday, 2000). 
 
It is possible, within each religion, to come up with interpretations 
that support equality and tolerance, as shown by the cross cutting accep-
tance of the ‘Golden Rule,’ i.e. treat everyone as you yourself would wish 
to be treated, which has equality and tolerance at its very heart. Inter-
pretations or misinterpretations, which appear to discriminate against 
women, provide a good pedagogic opportunity to challenge given no-
tions, biases and stereotypes in religion. The use of comparative exam-
ples enriches the interpretative exercise. It can be demonstrated by his-
torical example that religious views and interpretations change with the 
times; religious views in relation to slavery and racial discrimination can 
be instructive case studies. Religious education must also ensure that 
women’s perspectives are not lacking from religious viewpoints and that 
religious and cultural heritage is drawn from experiences and role-
models of both women and men.66 There is evidence of women being 
influential in the teaching and preaching of the early churches. These 
historical facts can prove to be an eye opener in relation to religion’s 
current stance on women and their religious ability.67 
What is taught as religious education is a very sensitive matter. Par-
ents have a right to ensure teaching of their children is done ‘in confor-
________________ 
66 The role of religious education in the pursuit of tolerance and non-
discrimination-study prepared under the guidance of Prof. Abdelfattah Amor, Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the question of religious intoler-
ance, International Consultative Conference on School Education in relation with 
Freedom of Religion and Belief, Tolerance and Non-discrimination (Madrid, 23–25 
November 2001). UN: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
67 Boyle & Sheen (1997), in relation to Japan, where it can be seen that although 
women actually started up various Shinto sects once these religions became institu-
tionalised, women were pushed out of positions of authority. Also see Thurman, 
1999, at 87 for the same reoccurrence in Buddhism. 
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mity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.’68 The 
teaching of religion is also seen to fall within the right to freedom of re-
ligion and belief given to religions.69 This means that although States are 
obliged to ensure that religion is taught in a gender equal fashion, they 
have to implement this obligation in a manner sensitive to the views of 
parents and religion. It has been shown that the best models of religious 
education are those that integrate consultation into the whole teaching 
process (Eidsvag & Sween, 2004). This is not to say that the States must 
bow to pressure from parents and religious leaders and allow gender 
discrimination to be taught under the pretext of religion, but that they 
must merely allow everyone to have their view listened and responded 
to. A full and constructive consultative process can help to illuminate  
a path through this potential minefield. It should be highlighted to par-
ents and religions, when initiating such consultation, that the goal is to 
strengthen and develop a student’s spirituality and to ensure the contin-
ued relevance and legitimacy of religion and belief in today’s world. 
 
 
10. Instituting Change through Support & Funding  
for Research & Surveys on Gender Equality within Religion 
 
The states’ goal must be to encourage internal change within religion 
towards gender equality in line with their legal obligations. As stated 
earlier, those in authority within religion can be reluctant to initiate this 
process. While the use of education is one way to create a movement and 
internal pressure for change, states can also facilitate this by providing 
the requisite space and support to alternative, gender equal, religious 
views, thereby allowing them to grow and influence the official stance of 
the various religions. Alongside this the state can initiate and fund re-
search and surveys designed to highlight the desire for gender equality 
among church members and the dissatisfaction current discrimination 
causes. Such research and surveys should concentrate on the current 
________________ 
68 Article 2, First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights 1952 
CETS 9; See also Article 5, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, GA Res. 36/55, 25 November 1981. 
69 Article 6, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Based on Belief, 
ibid.; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 on the Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion (Article 18), 30 July 1993, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\ 
Rev.1 at para. 4. 
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religious and societal views of ‘the faithful.’ Recent surveys have demon-
strated that there is a vast discrepancy between the views of Catholics 
on such ‘societal’ views as female ordination, divorce, abortion, contra-
ception and the married status of priests and the official stance of the 
Catholic Church.70 The majority of Catholics worldwide disagree with 
Catholic doctrine on these matters.71 Such discrepancies are not limited 
to the Catholic Church; an increasing number of religious people feel 
that religion should not interfere in the personal choices an individual 
makes.72 Even those who wish religious law to apply to their personal 
lives feel that such law should be gender equal.73 Using the results of 
such research, states can draw to religious leaders’ attention the grow-
ing disparity between their religion’s official views and the views of its 
members in relation to gender equality. 
In earlier times, there was consensus within religion that previous 
religious legal decisions should be kept under constant review to ensure 
they retained their relevancy and legitimacy (An-Na’im, 1996, n. 88 at 
345). This early practice should be remembered and resurrected. When 
religion is out of step with societal values and is unwilling to start the 
process of change, or change is occurring at too slow a pace, it starts to 
lose its legitimacy. All the ‘founders’ of the main religions recognised this 
fact.74 It is a misnomer that religion is static and unchanging ‘religious 
________________ 
70 Global Study of Roman Catholics (Anon., 2014). This was a scientific poll, 
commissioned by the Vatican, of more than 12,000 Catholics in 12 countries repre-
senting Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America. Wijngaards, 2000. 
71 The majority of Catholics worldwide disagree with Catholic doctrine on di-
vorce, abortion, and contraceptives. Additionally, the majority of Catholics in Europe, 
Latin America and the United States disagree with established doctrine on the mar-
riage of priests as well as on women entering the priesthood as found in Global Study 
of Roman Catholics (Anon., 2014).  
72 Wijngaards, 2000, discusses the steady shift in European attitudes towards 
more personal autonomy and freedom seen within the Gallup research known as 
‘The European Values Systems’ studies in 1981 and 1990 and also comparable stud-
ies in the USA and Australia, which show that the majority of believers now feel that 
the locus of religious authority lies within themselves. 
73 The results of the field study are particularly interesting as it shows that al-
though Palestinians automatically want to be governed by Shari'a law they wish it to 
be gender neutral. 
74 Mohammed, Buddha and Christ all appear to have assimilated the 'good' local 
customs and practices into their religion and ensured their teachings gained legiti-
macy by only changing the local culture where it clashed with the basic precepts of 
their religion. Although it is asserted that they wished to alleviate the discrimination 
of women, they accepted that they were unable to make great advances in this area 
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traditions are in a constant state of change and adaption in response to 
their surrounding social conditions’ (Berger, 2012, p. 28). If a religion 
loses its legitimacy, it loses its members and position of power within 
society. Where a religion feels that this is happening it is generally will-
ing to change to ‘capture’ its market share of believers once more. 
 
 
11. Encouragement for Religions to Enter  
into Internal Consultation 
 
With firm evidence of a disparity between the views of those claim-
ing to represent a religion and the members of that religion, the state 
would be in a good position to convince those leaders to enter into an 
internal consultation process with all their members. The state could 
also encourage the adoption of good practice across religions by organis-
ing, funding and publicising an inter-religious conference on gender 
equality. This would at the very least put the topic on the religious 
agenda and in the public eye. In order to mobilise the whole of society to 
campaign for gender equality within religion, the state could also initi-
ate, fund and publish reports that study the impact that gender discrimi-
nation within religion has on women and society as a whole. This would 
help to open people’s eyes to the negative consequences of religious dis-
criminatory views and practices and create a climate more conducive to 
religious change. Religions are reactive; they react to social practices and 
new social realities. State and societal pressure can therefore prompt 
and facilitate a change in official religious views. 
In order to underpin such a change in official religious views states 
should also proactively encourage religions to initiate, draft and publish 
independent feasibility studies in relation to gender equal interpreta-
tions of sacred texts etc to support true gender equality within religion 
and the acceptance of women’s cultic ability. One of the main ways in 
which gender equality can be effectively realised within religion is by 
women being an integral part of the leadership structure and having the 
________________ 
due to resistance to the idea of gender equality within the local cultures. It is some-
what ironic that while these great religious ‘leaders’ attempted to reduce discrimina-
tion against women, the religions that grew from them now use such ‘emancipating’ 
acts as justification to deny women equality (Thurman, 1999). For details about 
Buddha being unable to challenge the patriarchal attitudes of his time directly. In 
relation to the Prophet Mohammed, see Mayer, 1999. 
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authority to interpret, define and implement the religious creed. Law has 
a role to play in relation to this aspect of religious change and creating 
the requisite pressure to ‘encourage’ religious change.  
 
 
12. Use of Equality Law as an Instrument for Change 
 
At present many European States have legislation prohibiting sex 
discrimination within employment and the provision of services. All EU 
states must have such legislation.75 This legislation, however, specifically 
allows for sex discrimination to occur in relation to the non-employment 
of women or provision of services to women within an organised relig-
ion, where this occurs in order to comply with the doctrines of that relig-
ion or avoid conflict with the strongly held convictions of a significant 
amount of the religion’s followers.76 There are also similar provisions in 
relation to sexual orientation.77 There is no procedure within either the 
legislation itself, or legal jurisprudence, to determine whether such dis-
crimination is ‘justified’ by reference to a religion’s doctrine or mem-
ber’s views. The State simply takes the declarations of the religious lead-
ers at face value. It is asserted that a more sophisticated mechanism for 
determining the doctrines of that religion or whether a conviction is 
strongly held by a significant amount of the religion’s followers should 
be instituted, while this exemption is still in place. It is accepted that 
courts are very wary of becoming embroiled in religiously sensitive dis-
putes and straying over the well recognised State/ church divide. This is 
evident in the English High Court’s decision in Wachmann.78 However, 
while UK courts are still reluctant to interfere within religiously sensi-
tive disputes, this stance is gradually changing; UK courts are now will-
ing to treat ministers of religion as employees of the Church and as com-
ing within the ambit of Employment law, where the facts support such  
________________ 
75 Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC. 
76 For example, see UK Equality Act 2010, Sch 9, para. 2 & 3, Sch3, s29.; Section 
32 of the Australian Capital Territories Discrimination Act 1991; Article 28 of the 
New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993. 
77 See the UK Equality Act 2010, Sch 9, para. 2 & 3, Sch3, s29. The arguments 
outlined in this article could easily be used in relation to this protected category too.  
78 R v. Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the 
Commonwealth, ex parte Wachmann [1993] 2 All ER 249. 
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a conclusion.79 This however obviously only occurs where that religion 
accepts women, as ministers, in the first instance.  
In R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admis-
sions Appeal Panel of JFS and others,80 the UK Supreme Court was asked 
to adjudicate on whether the admissions policy of a Jewish religious 
school, using Matrilineal descent as the key criteria, was direct discrimi-
nation and thereby contravened Section 1 of the UK Race Relations Act 
1976. In their handling of this legal issue, although the Supreme Court 
found that the admissions policy did directly discriminate, it paid ex-
treme deference to the right of religions to determine their own mem-
bership and was almost apologetic in their judgment in being forced to 
stray into perceived ‘religious territory.’ It only found in such a way be-
cause it was argued on racial, as opposed to religious, grounds and 
therefore no religious exception could be utilised by the school. Regard-
less of how uncomfortable the courts are in straying into what they cur-
rently perceive as ‘religious territory,’ it should, though, be emphasised 
that the courts are an arm of the State and as such are legally obliged to 
do so under current State equality obligations.  
However strong a government’s desire to refrain from directly inter-
fering in the management of religious affairs, circumstances can compel 
them to take a stand on matters of faith, ritual and doctrine.81 The fact 
that the discrimination in relation to the non appointment of women 
within religious posts is mandated by the religious creed or beliefs does 
not detract from the State’s duty to ensure gender equality and the equal 
right of women to freedom of religion. The right to freedom of con-
science and belief has to be ensured equally to men and women; the 
right does not therefore cover gender discriminatory manifestations. In 
________________ 
79 The House of Lords decision in Percy v. Church of Scotland Board of National 
Mission [2005] UKHL 73, allowed the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to be applicable to 
ministers of religion; The UK Employment Appeals Tribunal decision in New Testa-
ment Church of God v. Reverend S Stewart [2007] IRLR 178, went further and specifi-
cally stated that ministers of religion could be employees of the church. There is no 
presumption against the contractual character of the service of ministers. The pri-
mary considerations are the manner in which a minister was engaged and the rules 
governing his or her service. If the manner could not fit within a contractual format 
they could not be an employee (Moore v President of the Methodist Conference 
[2013] UKSC 29). 
80 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions Appeal 
Panel of JFS and others [2009] UKSC 15. 
81 Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and 
Practices, 1960, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1. 
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order for a manifestation of belief to be protected under the right to 
freedom of religion, it must pass the non distinction test. If a practice is 
gender discriminatory then it should not therefore fall within the protec-
tion of human rights law. Technically speaking States cannot therefore 
exempt religions from the exercise of equality laws. 
Where there is reluctance on the part of religious leaders to move 
towards gender equality, which is evident at present, then the mere threat 
of removing these exemptions can prove to be an effective method of 
prompting internal change within religion. This can be seen by reference 
to the New Zealand ‘Gay Clergy’ debate. In New Zealand the tabling of the 
New Zealand Human Rights Act, and the prospect of expensive lawsuits 
from licensed homosexuals who wish to become pastors, prompted reli-
gious authorities to engage on a consultative process on the issue of gay 
ordination in order to decide the church’s stance on this matter. In this 
case the mere prospect of ‘State intrusion’ into the employment relation-
ships within the church had the positive effect of encouraging religions 
to embark on a consultative approach to update their self definition.82 
Interestingly, within the UK, there was talk of similar pressure being ap-
plied in relation to the established church, the Church of England. Mr 
Bradshaw, former UK Culture Secretary, raised the issue of amending 
the Church’s legal exemption to the Equality Act 2010 to help pave the 
way for female bishops.83 The Prime Minister was more circumspect 
stating that “although the time is right for women bishops ….we must 
respect individual institutions and how they work, while giving them a 
sharp prod.”84 Without doubt political pressure was however brought 
down on the Church of England to allow female bishops. This pressure 
was brought due, to a large extent, to the fact that the Church has seats 
in Parliament, is an establishment church, and the vast majority within 
its ranks supported the change. Such pressure has not been exerted on a 
non-establishment religion within the UK.  
There is a lesson to be learned here: political pressure and proposed 
changes in the law can lead to a ‘voluntary’ change in religious rules and 
________________ 
82 See Ahdar, 2001, for more information and a different viewpoint on the matter. 
83 More details can be found at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ 
9693229/David-Cameron-Church-needs-to-get-with-the-programme-after-rejecting- 
women-bishops.html [last accessed March 2015]. 
84 In Hansard, column 579, 21st Nov 2012: http://www.publications.parliam 
ent.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121121/debtext/121121-0001.htm#121121710 
00010 [last accessed March 2015]. 
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doctrine. Although the law can be used to facilitate changes in culture 
this must, however, be done sensitively and only to limited extent. 
Changes in law should reflect a burgeoning support for those changes in 
society. If the law imposes changes that garner insufficient support 
within society then civil disobedience, rebellion and a backlash against 
the imposed changes can ensue. Where change is unavoidable though, 
religious interpretations can be found to support that change.85 Once the 
State has ascertained through consultation, surveys, and research that 
society, both religious and otherwise, is agreeable to gender equality 
within religions it can then move to abolish the current legislative gen-
der equality exemptions for religion. By announcing their intention to 
amend gender equality legislation and remove the religious exemption, 
States can encourage religions to start an internal consultative process 
and re-think their official views on gender equality and female ordina-
tion. By insisting on equality within religious hiring procedures the State 
is not interfering with the internal workings of a religion, any more than 
it does in any other hiring situation. It is not telling a religion who to hire 
or dictating what the personal attributes or beliefs of their clergy should 
be, merely that each application for ordination/employment should be 
dealt with on an individual basis regardless of that individual’s gender. 
This means that the ‘post’ should, like any other role, be given to the 
person best suited intellectually and spiritually for the post. The em-
ployment decision should be based on whether an individual possesses 
the necessary personal attributes, skills, and experience for the post, not 
predicated upon their gender. 
 
 
 12. Potential Legal Action by Religions under  
the Right to Freedom of Religion 
 
It is idealistic to believe that all religions would simply accept this 
new stance of the State which would allow equality laws to operate 
within religion. Lobbying and social pressure would be applied upon the 
________________ 
85 This can be seen most commonly in relation to economic strictures but also in 
relation to racial equality. Where some religions and religious interpretations his-
torically supported racial discrimination, the change in societal views and law 
prompted a change in religious creeds. It should however be noted that some relig-
ions, notably the Quakers, were the backbone in the prohibition of slavery move-
ment and are active in combating discrimination and lobbying for fairer laws.  
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State, by organised religions, to reverse such a policy and religious lead-
ers may take legal advice on whether legal action to prevent such revo-
cation would have a chance of success. In any such legal action an appli-
cant, under a right to religion claim, would have to prove that the State 
had violated their right to religion by revoking, or not providing, an ex-
emption to gender equality legislation. The result of such legal action, if 
taken, is unclear. The jurisprudence of the European Court suggests that 
States would be given a wide margin of appreciation in relation to as-
sessing their actions in dealing with a sensitive matter such as this, 
where there is no common consensus among Council of Europe States.86 
This stance has to, however, be balanced alongside the European Court’s 
strict approach where a state is deemed to have interfered with the in-
ternal autonomy of a religion. The court’s approach depends, to a large 
degree, on whether the court classifies the law as a neutral law or a tar-
geted law. 
The European Court, although it is beginning to consider indirect ef-
fects in relation to article 9 cases,87 is still really only comfortable in ex-
tending the protection of Article 9 to those who have been directly af-
fected by a state action i.e. the law or State action is aimed directly at the 
restriction of the manifestation etc. of that religion.88 If the religious ap-
plicants could persuade the court that a revocation of their exemption 
was a targeted legal measure, as opposed to a neutral one, then the 
European Court would be likely to find that an interference with article 9 
had occurred and the margin of appreciation given to the state in decid-
ing whether or not this interference was objectively justified would be 
narrower. Where the legislation that is allegedly violating an individual’s 
or institution’s right to freedom of religion is generally applicable and 
'neutral,'89 the European Court has in the past denied that any interfer-
________________ 
86 For examples of this see Frette v. France, Supra. n. 17 at para. 40; Petrovic  
v. Austria, 1998-II; 33 EHRR 14, S.A.S v. France, ibid. 
87 This can be seen in relation to an argument of indirect discrimination on the 
basis of art 9 in conjunction with art 14, ECHR for example see The Church Of Jesus 
Christ Of Latter-Day Saints v. The United Kingdom (2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 18, para. 31. 
88 See Kokkinakis v. Greece, A260-A (1993); 7 EHRR 397; Dahlab v. Switzerland, 
Application No. 42393/98 (2001), for examples of how the European Court deals 
with ‘direct’ discrimination against religion. 
89 The term ‘neutral’ in the way it is used here means that the law in question is 
not directed at one religious group and not, on the face of it, religiously discrimina-
tory. 
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ence under Article 9 has arisen in relation to an individual’s rights,90 and 
while this stance has softened more recently,91 it has yet to accept that 
such interference has occurred in relation to an institution’s article 9 
right.92  
It is clear that gender equality employment legislation, directed at all 
employers within a State, is ‘neutral.’ Although the European Court has 
found a violation of Article 9 where States have interfered directly with 
the appointment of ministers of non-established churches,93 in the pre-
sent case the State would simply be acting to prevent gender discrimina-
tion being a factor in the hiring of an individual. It is not specifying or 
interfering in the employment process past the application of natural 
justice and equality rules. In this instance, the European Court would, in 
all probability, find that the State had not interfered with the applicant’s 
right to freedom of religion. There is, however, a possibility, based on 
the conscientious objector strand of jurisprudence,94 that the applicant 
would be successful in showing that their protected religious rights had 
been interfered with. While the court is, though, becoming more open to 
finding a breach of article 9 on the basis of a claim of ‘indirect discrimi-
nation’ where conscientious objection to military service and its related 
implications are involved,95 it has not yet found a breach on this basis in 
regard to other religious manifestations. The court has only dealt with 
institutional claims of indirect discrimination in relation to the treat-
ment of one religion vis a vis another religion, i.e. where an issue of the 
________________ 
90 Valsamis v. Greece, Application No. 21787/93 (1996); Efstratiou v. Greece, 
1996-VI; 24 E.H.R.R 298. 
91 In S.A.S. the Court did find an article 9 interference even though the law was 
nominally a ‘neutral’ one in that it banned all full face covering in public. 
92 It has however accepted that such interference is possible within an article  
14 & 9 case, The Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter-Day Saints v. The United Kingdom 
(2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 18. 
93 See Serif v. Greece 31 EHRR 20; and Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, ibid. 
94 Thlimmenos v. Greece & Bayatyan v Armenia, Ibid., Erçep v. Turkey (applica-
tion no. 43965/04) ECHR 254 (2011). 
95 The right to indirect discrimination, namely when States without an objective 
and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different, was accepted by the European Court in Thlimmenos v. Greece 
(34369/97) (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 15. In Bayatyan v Armenia (23459/03) (2012) 54 
E.H.R.R. 15, the European Court first found an article 9 violation for the refusal of 
Armenia to introduce civilian service as an alternative to compulsory military ser-
vice and the conviction and imprisonment of the applicant for refusing to do military 
service on the basis of his religious beliefs. 
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plurality of religion is affected, which in this situation, would not be ap-
plicable. It is, however, open to the applicant religion to argue for the 
application of the ‘conscientious objector’ test, with its stricter margin of 
appreciation, in relation to their institutional rights.96 
In the event that the European Court did find that the State had in-
terfered with the petitioner’s right to freedom of religion, it is obvious 
that equality legislation would clear the ‘prescribed by law’ hurdle and 
pursues the legitimate aim of attaining gender equality. It is only in rela-
tion to the proportionality aspect of the current ‘necessary in a democ-
ratic society’ test that there may be some element of doubt. The outcome 
of the European Court’s deliberations depends on the margin of appre-
ciation it utilises: the wider the margin the more certain the state’s suc-
cess. If the applicant is arguing to retain an exemption already in the law, 
the burden on the state to justify the removal, due to an implicit protec-
tion of status quo, may be higher than otherwise as this appears to be  
a targeted action. In justifying the removal, it is thought, that the state 
would need to provide evidence that its people, and particularly those 
within that religion, were supportive of the gender equality laws being 
completely applicable within religion in its territory. The state, in doing 
so, could however fall into the trap of showing that they were interfering 
with that religion’s autonomy by removing the exception, and social en-
gineering change, and trigger the court’s strict scrutiny. Conversely 
where a religion is arguing that an exemption to a neutral law should be 
made, the margin of appreciation the court would employ is normally be 
very wide. In considering the width of the margin of appreciation the 
court’s stance would also be heavily dependent on the situation within 
the majority of Council of Europe states. Where there is no consensus 
among the Council of Europe states an individual state has more discre-
tion in its actions; the more states have such exemptions the less discre-
tion is given to the individual state to ‘buck the trend.’ 
________________ 
96 The issue at the heart of the conscientious objector cases appears to be that 
there were reasonable alternatives available to military service, which the state had 
not utilised but the majority of Council of Europe states had, and the system had 
failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of society as a whole and those of 
the conscientious objectors This development of article 9 jurisprudence is interest-
ing and could prove beneficial to religious institutions arguing that they should have 
an exemption from a neutral equality law provision on the basis of the impact of the 
disputed law and taking account of the balancing required. 
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There are various factors that the European Court will take into ac-
count when considering whether an interference can be objectively jus-
tified. The main question is whether there are any lessor reasonable 
means of achieving the same aim and a consideration by the court of the 
impact of the measure has had on the applicant weighed up against the 
strength of the legitimate aim. The successful outcomes of the conscien-
tious objector cases were predicated on the fact that there are suitable 
alternatives to accommodate the competing interests of the state and 
that the majority of states utilised such alternatives. In relation to the 
legitimate aim of ensuring gender equality within religion, it could be 
strongly refuted that there are any suitable alternatives, to ensure the 
same outcome, so this argument would be likely to fail. Given the weight 
of the opposing claim, i.e. gender equality, it would be surprising if the 
court did not allow the state discretion in how they balanced the ‘oppos-
ing’ rights unless some inequality in the state’s treatment of various re-
ligions was also argued i.e. an article 14 & 9 argument. Judging from the 
past decisions in this area, whereas the European Court is reluctant to 
find a neutral law disproportionate and force a State to create excep-
tions to a general rule,97 it finds it easier to hold that a targeted law is 
contrary to article 9. It really comes down to, at the end of the day, how 
the court characterises the applicable law and whether it accepts that 
such a law intrudes into the sphere of religious autonomy. If it finds that 
there is prima facie direct discrimination, which considerably intrudes 
into the sphere of religious autonomy, then the state may lose in the 
weighing up of the proportionality of the action, regardless of its legiti-
mate aim of gender equality due to the primacy given to this autonomy. 
Otherwise, it is likely that the court give its usual deference to the state’s 
view, in such matters, at the balancing stage. A state should therefore 
think carefully on how to institute any such legal changes, taking the 
European Court’s judicial tendencies into account. The outcome is de-
pendent on how the legal measure is drawn up and how the matter is 
presented and argued in court. Ultimately, it is asserted that the court 
would side with the state in this matter but this is not by any means cer-
tain. 
On the other side of the equation, human rights law does however al-
low a State to create exceptions to the general rule where it feels that 
________________ 
97 For a case in point, see ISKCON v Secretary of State for the Environment, (1994) 
18 EHRR CD 133. 
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such exceptions are necessary to ensure human rights or fulfil a societal 
need. Should a woman, who wishes to be a minister of religion, take an 
action against a State for allowing organised religion an exception to the 
general employment equality laws, it is highly unlikely she would win 
her case within any domestic, international or religion judicial arena. 
States are given a wide margin of appreciation where there is a lack of 
common State consensus. Although it is stated that there should be 
weighty reasons to justify interference with the right to gender equal-
ity98, States have been allowed to limit the ambit of gender equality 
where there is an objective and reasonable justification for the limita-
tion.99 Looking at past case law, it is pretty clear that if the State framed 
their limitation of gender equality, in this context, in terms of needing to 
give due deference to a religion’s right to freedom of religion and inter-
nal autonomy, the European Court, at least, would accept this as a valid 
justification and reject the women’s claim.100 The ball, as ever, lies in the 
State's court. 
 
 13. Conclusions 
 
Article 9 of the Convention states that everyone has the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and belief. At present, however, it is clear 
that women do not have an equal right to religion. ‘To be able to search 
for an understanding of the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way is 
among the most important aspects of a life that is truly human’ (Nuss-
baum, 2000, at 179). If we accept this as a truism, then it is of utmost 
importance that we work towards the attainment of this right for 
women. Although theoretically women have an equal right to religion, 
and make up the majority of believers, they have been effectively denied 
their equal right to religion through the operation of patriarchal reli-
________________ 
98 Petrovic v. Austria, n. 125. 
99 Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Educa-
tion in Belgium v. Belgium A.6 (1968); 1 EHRR 252. 
100 The European Court, like every human rights judicial body, takes the concept 
of subsidiary very seriously. It feels that ‘[b]y reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries, the national authorities are in princi-
ple better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions,’ 
Frette v. France, n. 17. The Court’s decisions, especially in relation to religion, usually 
rest on the premise of ensuring societal peace, as seen in Otto Preminger v. Austria 
A295-A (1994); 19 EHRR 34. Taking this into consideration it is likely that the Euro-
pean Court would accept the State’s viewpoint and reject the gender equality claim. 
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gious creeds and power structures. While equality is one of the corner-
stone beliefs of every religion, gender discrimination pervades religious 
structure, creed and practices. Due to a lack of authority and power 
within religion, women are powerless to effect change towards gender 
equality within their own religion. Currently State policies and laws are 
complicit in the discrimination of women by and within religion. The 
right to freedom of religion has been judicially interpreted in such a way 
as to give religious leaders the ability to silent internal dissent and insu-
late their ‘religion’ from change. By ceding the individual human right to 
freedom of conscience and belief to patriarchal religious institutions, 
pursuing a policy of non interference in relation to religion and accept-
ing as inevitable and unchangeable the clash between women rights and 
religion, the world has effectively denied women the freedom of con-
science and belief. This denial has had and continues to have a crucial 
impact on gender equality as a whole. 
States have an international obligation to change discriminatory re-
ligious attitudes and allow women an equal right within religion. States 
are not powerless in relation to religion. Although change must come 
from within, the State can help to facilitate positive change in religion 
towards gender equality. Religious views are not static; they are reactive 
to social change. The State needs to create an environment conducive to 
religious change towards gender equality. It can do this by ripening 
views favourable to gender equality, both within and out with religion, 
through education and the raising of awareness by the publication of 
surveys and research. Once a critical mass of people within society and 
religion recognises the need for and supports gender equality within 
religion, the pressure on religion to engage upon an internal process of 
change, towards gender equality, can be increased by careful use of the 
law. The retraction of religious exemptions to gender equality laws 
could prove to be such a trigger point and one that is acceptable within 
the current international regional human rights systems. Religions can 
change in their views; they simply sometimes require a reason to 
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